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ERISA: TO SUE OR NOT TO SUE-A
QUESTION OF STATUTORY
STANDING
Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA)1 in response to. the tremendous expansion
in numbers, scope, coverage, and abuse of employee benefit
plans. 2 ERISA provides a comprehensive set of rules "to assure
equitable and fair administration" of these benefit plans.3 The
rules were designed to establish new rights and safeguards for
workers in such areas as vesting of benefits, funding of pension
plans, and fiduciary duties.
Section 502 of ERISA provides for the administration and en-
forcement of the Act.4 Subsection (a) of this section, entitled
"Persons empowered to bring a civil action," has been the sub-
ject of considerable debate and is the focus of this Note.' Sec-
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18,
26, 29, 31 & 42 U.S.C.).
2. "From 1969 to 1970, rapid growth of the private pension system resulted in ap-
proximately 30 million workers, comprising 48% of the work force, being covered by
private pension plans in 1970." M. SToKES & L. Fox, EMPLOYERS' GUIDE TO THE Em-
PLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 (ERISA) 1 (1976) (available from
Stokes & Shapiro, Attorneys-at-Law, 3920 First National Bank Tower, Atlanta, Georgia
30303). This rapid growth was accompanied by problems. Many workers lost their bene-
fits when they left jobs, even after long service. Companies shut down and, due to insuffi-
cient funds in their pension plans, were unable to pay their employees promised pension
benefits. Pension funds were irresponsibly invested. See id. at 1-2.
3. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4639, 4641.
4. ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982).
5. ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1982) in its entirety provides:
§ 502. CIVIL ENFORCEMENT
(a) A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a pafticipant, beneficiary or fiduciary for
appropriate relief under section 409;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms
of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
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tion 502(a) provides, in pertinent part, that persons empowered
to bring a civil action under ERISA include plan participants,6
beneficiaries,7 fiduciaries,8 and the Secretary of Labor."
This Note examines the conflicting authority regarding the
scope of section 502(a) of ERISA. There is a fundamental split
among the United States Courts of Appeals concerning whether
parties not specifically enumerated in section 502(a) have stand-
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this sub-
chapter or the terms of the plan;
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate
relief in the case of a violation of 105(c) of this title;
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, by the
Secretary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provi-
sion of this subchapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable
relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of
this subchapter; or
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (i) of
this section.
6. "Participant" is defined as:
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former
member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a
benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of
such employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be
eligible to receive any such benefit.
ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1982).
7. "Beneficiary" is defined as:
a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit
plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder.
ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1982).
8. "Fiduciary" is defined as:
(A) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a fiduciary
with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority
or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any
authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he
renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect,
with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority
or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discre-
tionary responsibility in the administration of such plan. Such term includes any
person designated under section 405(c)(1)(B) of this title.
(B) If any money or other property of an employee benefit plan is invested in
securities issued by an investment company registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, such investment shall not by itself cause such investment
company or such investment company's investment adviser or principal under-
writer to be deemed to be a fiduciary or a party in interest as those terms are
defined in this subchapter, except insofar as such investment company or its
investment adviser or principal underwriter acts in connection with an employee
benefit plan covering employees of the investment company, the investment ad-
viser, or its principal underwriter. Nothing contained in this subparagraph shall
limit the duties imposed on such investment company, investment advisor, or
principal underwriter by any other law.
ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (1982).
9. "Secretary" is defined as the Secretary of Labor. ERISA § 3(13), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(13) (1982).
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ing to bring civil actions to enforce ERISA's provisions. The
Ninth Circuit has held consistently that non-enumerated parties
are entitled to sue under ERISA.1 ° The Second Circuit, however,
repeatedly has held that parties not explicitly specified in sec-
tion 502(a). do not have standing to bring an action under the
Act.1" This Note addresses the question of whether employers
1 2
10. In Fentron Indus., Inc. v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 674 F.2d 1300 (9th
Cir. 1982), the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff-employer, a non-enumerated party,
had standing to sue the defendant-pension fund for violations of ERISA. 674 F.2d at
1304. In Fentron, an employer who withdrew from a pension plan brought suit against
the fund and its trustees for failing to pay vested pension benefits, for cancelling the past
service credits of all Fentron employees, and for offering to restore cancelled past credits
to employees who would leave Fentron and work for a contributing employer. Id. The
court rejected the defendants' argument that the employer lacked standing to sue for
enforcement of ERISA's provisions because it did not fall within one of the four classes
of persons enumerated in section 502(a). Id. at 1305.
See also Award Serv., Inc. v. Northern Cal. Retail Clerks Pension Fund, 763 F.2d 1066
(9th Cir. 1985) (holding that employer had standing to sue to recover $167,000 in mis-
taken contributions to pension fund); Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v.
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983) (Judge Posner holding that
although pension plans as such do not have standing to sue under the securities laws,
"ERISA confers on pension plans standing to sue for breach of fiduciary obligations
under ERISA."); Michigan United Food & Commercial Workers' Unions v. Baerwaldt,
572 F. Supp 943 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (holding that fund had standing to sue to obtain
declaratory judgment that a Michigan insurance statute was preempted by ERISA as
impermissibly dictating terms of an employee benefit plan), rev'd on other grounds, 767
F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1985); Building Serv. Pension v. Horseman's Quarter Horse Racing
Ass'n, 98 F.R.D. 458 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (holding that employer had standing to sue to
prevent fund from compelling production of certain employee information for purpose of
determining if employees subject to forfeiture of pension payments).
11. In Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Sec. Fund v. Continental Assur-
ance Co., 700 F.2d 889 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1233, cert. denied, 464 U.S.
845 (1983), the Second Circuit held that an employee benefit plan, as a non-enumerated
party, did not have standing to bring an action for breach of fiduciary responsibility
under ERISA. Id. at 892. The benefit plan in Pressroom was created pursuant to a col-
lective bargaining agreement to provide life insurance and other fund benefits to partici-
pants. The fund alleged that the defendant insurance company, which had underwritten
all the life insurance for the fund, perpetrated a fraudulent scheme to extract millions of
dollars in exorbitant premiums from it. Id. at 891.
See also Tuvia Convalescent Center, Inc. v. National Union of Hosp. & Health Care
Employees, 717 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1983) (court, relying on Pressroom, holding that em-
ployer does not have standing to sue under ERISA for breach of fiduciary duties); Mod-
ern Woodcrafts, Inc. v. Hawley, 534 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Conn. 1982) (holding that em-
ployer lacked standing to sue for refund of overcharge by pension fund). But cf. Local
807 Labor-Management Pension Fund v. Owens Trucking, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 616, 617
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (court felt "bound" by Second Circuit's "narrow" view of standing in
Pressroom, stating in dictum that it thought a pension plan should have standing to
sue).
12. This Note will limit its discussion to the question of standing of employers qua
employers and pension funds qua pension funds. Many cases, however, have held that a
plaintiff's role as an employer, or as a pension fund, is inseparable from its role as a
fiduciary. See Great Lakes Steel, Div. of Nat'l Steel Corp. v. Deggendorf, 716 F.2d 1101
(6th Cir. 1983) (holding that an employer in a fiduciary capacity has standing to sue);
United States Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 669 F.2d 124 (3d
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and pension funds,"s as non-enumerated parties, have standing
under ERISA."'
Part I of this Note discusses generally the concept of standing
to sue. Part II analyzes the language and structure of section 502
of ERISA in light of judicial canons of construction, and con-
cludes that Congress did not intend the statute to preclude an
employer and/or a pension fund from bringing an action to en-
force its provisions. Part III examines the legislative history un-
derlying section 502 and determines that Congress did not in-
tend to leave employers and pension funds without redress
under ERISA. Finally, Part IV considers other relevant statutes
and construes section 502(a) in light of these other statutes. Af-
ter examining the conflicting legal precedents interpreting sec-
tion 502(a), the language and the history of ERISA, and statutes
similar to ERISA, this Note concludes that Congress did not in-
tend section 502(a) to be exclusive and defends the position that
Cir. 1982) (holding that an employer with the sole authority to determine terms of em-
ployee health insurance plans and administrative salary continuance plans has standing
to sue under ERISA as a fiduciary); Laborers Fringe Benefit Funds-Detroit & Vicinity v.
Northwest Concrete and Constr., Inc., 640 F.2d 1350 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding, with little
or no discussion, that a trust fund was a trustee of the contributions, and was therefore a
fiduciary with access to the courts under ERISA); Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir.
1978) (holding plaintiff-employer a fiduciary, therefore empowered to sue, solely on the
basis of the plaintiff's designation of plan fiduciaries and offering of investment advice to
the trustee). See also SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, RETIREMENT IN-
COME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4838, 4864 ("A fiduciary is one who occupies a position of confi-
dence or trust .... a person who exercises any power of control .... "). Under such an
analysis of the meaning of fiduciary, an employer or fund would have clear access to the
courts under the express language of § 502(a).
13. This Note will use the terms "pension fund," "fund," "plan," and "pension plan"
interchangeably to refer to any and all of the employee benefit plans ERISA covers.
ERISA presently covers three basic types of plans. The first type is defined contribu-
tion plans (individual account plans), which provide for individual accounts for partici-
pants and include profit-sharing plans and stock bonus plans. Benefits are based solely
on contributions and gains and losses related to such contributions. ERISA § 3(34), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1982). The second type is defined benefit plans, which are commonly
referred to as the "pension plans." These plans are fixed dollar benefit plans, usually
based on the employee's number of years of service. ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35)
(1982). The third type is employee welfare benefit plans, which provide for benefits such
as insurance and vacation pay. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982). The plans must
meet certain disclosure requirements and are subject to ERISA's fiduciary standards, but
are exempt from the vesting and funding requirements. ERISA §§ 201(1), 301(a)(1), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1051(1), 1081(a)(1) (1982).
14. There is a question as to whether other non-enumerated parties have standing to
bring an action under ERISA. See, e.g., Utility Workers Union v. Consumers Power Co.,
453 F. Supp. 447, 450 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (holding that a union lacks standing to sue),
afl'd, 637 F.2d 1082 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1014
(1981), rev'd, 663 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1981); Hibernia Bank v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 411 F. Supp. 478, 488 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (holding that a bank with which trusts
had commercial accounts lacks standing to sue).
Statutory Standing
employers and pension funds, collectively, have statutory stand-
ing to sue under the Act.
I. STANDING TO SUE GENERALLY
Entry into the federal courts is limited by statutory, constitu-
tional, and prudential considerations. These issues are fre-
quently consolidated by the courts and are considered as a single
question of "standing to sue."' 5 Failure to separate these dimen-
sions of standing has resulted in an inconsistent body of law in
this area.16 Thus, for purposes of exposition, this Note divides
the issue of standing to sue under ERISA into its statutory, con-
stitutional, and prudential components, focusing principally on
statutory standing.
A comprehensive analysis of constitutional and prudential
standing is beyond the scope of this Note. These dimensions of
standing, however, merit brief address so as to clearly distin-
guish them from statutory standing. Once a court has deter-
mined that employers and pension funds, collectively, have stat-
utory standing to sue under ERISA, fact-specific constitutional
and prudential considerations may still limit access to judicial
review on an ad hoc basis.
In terms of constitutional limitations, standing imports jus-
ticiability. The United States Constitution restricts the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts to "cases" and "controversies. ' 17 A dis-
15. Standing has been defined as the "entitlement to judicial action." C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3531 (2d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE]. The requirement of standing focuses
on the party seeking judicial review, not on the issues this party seeks to have adjudi-
cated. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982). But see Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for
Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 663-64 (1977) ("The law of standing has thus
become a surrogate for decisions on the merits .... ").
Often the term standing is misused by the courts to refer to such matters as the exist-
ence of a cause of action, identification of the real party in interest, and capacity to sue.
See WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra at § 3531.
16. "One commentator has noted that the concept of standing is 'among the most
amorphous in the domain of public law.'" Marshall & Ilsley Corp. v. Heimann, 652 F.2d
685, 690 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 465, 498 (1966)
(statement of Prof. Paul A. Freund)), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 981 (1982). See also Grad-
dick v. Newman, 453 U.S. 928, 938 (1981) (opinion of Rehnquist, J., in chambers)
(" 'Standing' is not a term used for its precision."); Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72
CALIF. L. REV. 68, 73 (1984) ("Standing law is unsatisfactory... because of unprincipled
decisionmaking."); Tushnet, supra note 15, at 663 ("the law of standing lacks a rational
conceptual framework").
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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pute is capable of judicial resolution only if the plaintiff has
made out a case or controversy within the meaning of Article
111.18
To satisfy the threshold requirement of presenting a case or
controversy, the plaintiff must show that she has suffered a per-
sonal "injury in fact."1 "Injury in fact" has become a term of
art.20 This requirement prohibits a plaintiff from merely assert-
ing the rights of a third party and assures concrete adversariness
so as to sharpen the presentation of the issues.
Many different types of injuries may confer constitutional
standing. The sufficiency of a noneconomic injury as a basis
upon which to confer standing was established by the Supreme
Court in Sierra Club v. Morton.2 ' Disruption of the plaintiff's
relationship with a third party is one noneconomic injury specif-
ically recognized by the Court as sufficient to lay the basis for
standing.2  In Fentron Industries, Inc. v. National Shopmen
Pension Fund,2" the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff had
suffered an injury in fact because the defendant's actions had
injured Fentron's relationship with a third party-its employ-
ees. 24 The pension fund's failure to pay vested pension benefits
to Fentron employees threatened to undermine Fentron's rela-
tionship with its work force. Moreover, the defendant's offer to
restore cancelled past service credits to employees who would
quit Fentron threatened direct economic injury to the employer
by creating an incentive for employees to seek other employ-
ment.2 5 In sum, the question of constitutional standing, as ap-
plied to suits brought by non-enumerated parties under ERISA,
requires an ad hoc determination as to whether the employer or
the pension fund as plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact. The
18. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975).
19. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152
(1970).
20. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACCE, supra note 15, at § 3531.4.
21. 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972) (dictum). In Morton, a conservation club brought suit
against federal officials, seeking to enjoin the commercial exploitation of a national game
refuge. Plaintiffs claimed that they would be injured by the destruction of the scenery
and wildlife in the park. Id. at 734. In dictum, the Court stated that it did not dispute
that this type of harm "may amount to an 'injury in fact' sufficient to lay the basis for
standing." Id. at 734. See also Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 479 n.3 (1981) (constitu-
tional or other personal interests); Council for Employment & Economic Energy Use v.
F.C.C., 575 F.2d 311, 314 (1st Cir.) (injury to political rights), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 911
(1978); Brookhaven Housing Coalition v. Solomon, 583 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1978) (denial of
public benefits).
22. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925).
23. 674 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1982).




courts have construed the injury in fact prerequisite very
broadly. The plaintiff need only establish that its rights, as op-
posed to the rights of a third party, have been impaired by de-
fendant's actions. If the plaintiff satisfies this requirement, then
the plaintiff's personal stake in the action is deemed sufficient to
pass the constitutional standing hurdle. Once the employer or
pension fund has crossed this minimum constitutional threshold,
however, prudential considerations may still limit access to the
federal courts.
Prudential standing determinations permit the courts to limit
their exercise of jurisdiction if, as a matter of judicial self-re-
straint, it seems wise not to entertain a particular case.2 6 In As-
sociation of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp,
2 7
the Supreme Court set forth a tripartite prudential test com-
monly used to determine if a plaintiff should be granted stand-
ing to sue where such plaintiff has not been expressly empow-
ered by a statute to enforce its provisions. The Court held that
the plaintiff must: (1) suffer an injury in fact; (2) fall within the
zone of interests protected by the statute allegedly violated; and
(3) show that the statute itself does not preclude the suit.
28
Article III concepts lie at the heart of the injury in fact re-
quirement. The Court in Data Processing observed that pruden-
tial standing must be considered in the framework of the case or
controversy requirement.2 9 Hence, a plaintiff who has crossed
the constitutional standing threshold has necessarily met the
first element of the Data Processing test. Applying the Data
Processing test, the Ninth Circuit in Fentron held that the
plaintiff-employer suffered an injury in fact.30
Courts usually consult the legislative history of a statute in
determining whether a plaintiff falls within the zone of pro-
tected interests so as to satisfy the second element of the Data
Processing test.3 1 In Fentron, the court held that Fentron's inju-
ries fell "within the zone of interests that Congress intended to
26. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-501 (1975);
Young v. Klutznick, 652 F.2d 617, 623 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.. 939 (1982).
27. 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (holding that firms selling data processing services had stand-
ing to challenge a rule that allowed national banks to provide such services to other
banks and to customers).
28. Id. at 152-54.
29. Id. at 151-52.
30. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Jet Courier Servs., Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 713 F.2d 1221 (6th Cir.
1983); Alschuler v. Department of HUD, 686 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1982); Control Data
Corp. v. Baldrige, 655 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881 (1981).
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protect when it enacted ERISA," insofar as ERISA was designed
to promote "the stability of employment," and the "successful
development of industrial relations. '32 The threat to Fentron's
relationship with the union and its employees fell within this
range of concerns. 3
The final condition-that the statute itself does not preclude
the suit-is the requirement of statutory standing. This Note
concludes that ERISA does not preclude suits brought by em-
ployers and pension funds. Similarly, in Fentron, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that it did not "believe that Congress, in enacting
ERISA, intended to prohibit employers from suing to enforce its
provisions.'34
In sum, although this Note defends the position that employ-
ers and pension plans have statutory standing to sue under
ERISA, their ultimate access to the federal courts may be lim-
ited on an ad hoc basis by constitutional and prudential
considerations.
In contrast to the constitutional and prudential dimensions of
standing, the statutory dimension may be decided categorically
by the courts for all employers and all pension funds. Statutory
standing decisions are not based on the particular facts of each
case. Rather, this inquiry involves interpreting ERISA and de-
termining whether Congress intended employers and pension
funds in general to have standing.
The primary objective of statutory interpretion is ascertaining
legislative intent." In determining congressional intent, courts
consider a variety of different types of evidence. Courts may
seek the aid of so-called intrinsic evidence, found by reference to
the language and structure of the statute itself, and of so-called
extrinsic evidence, found in the statute's legislative history and
by reference to other, related statutes.3 " Each of these types of
evidence must be considered in determining whether Congress
intended section 502(a) to categorically preclude employers and
pension plans from suing to enforce ERISA's provisions.
32. 674 F.2d at 1305 (citing and quoting ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)). See
infra notes 63, 65 and accompanying text.
33. 674 F.2d at 1305.
34. Id. at 1305.
35. 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.01 (Sands 4th ed. 1984) [herein-
after cited as SUTHERLAND] and cases cited therein.
36. See generally F. McCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 27-46 (1953); SUTHER-
LAND, supra note 35, at §§ 47.01-48.20, 51.01-.08.
[VOL. 19:1
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II. THE LANGUAGE AND STRUCTURE OF SECTION 502
The language of a statute should be the starting point of any
inquiry into the statute's scope. 7 The language of section 502(a)
does not explicitly authorize employers or' pension funds to
bring actions to enforce ERISA's provisions. Rather, it author-
izes actions to be brought by plan participants, beneficiaries, fi-
duciaries, and the Secretary of Labor.38 Nonetheless, based upon
an examination of the language and structure of section 502 in
light of various judicial canons of construction,39 it is evident
that Congress did not intend to leave employers and pension
funds without the ability to sue under ERISA.
A. Expressio Unius
As a general rule of statutory construction, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
In other words, the specific expression of one thing implies the
exclusion of the other.41 Expressio unius is not a rule of law,
however, and the omission of employers and pension funds from
the language of section 502(a) is not conclusive evidence that
Congress intended the provision to be exclusive. In Fentron,42
for example, the Ninth Circuit recognized that employers were
not one of the four enumerated parties granted standing to sue
under section 502(a). Nevertheless, in holding that employers
have standing to sue under ERISA, the court found that "[tihe
omission of employers from 29 U.S.C. § 1132 [ERISA § 502] is
not [in and of itself] significant in this regard."'4 s
37. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); SUTHERLAND, supra note 35,
at § 45.01 and cases cited therein.
38. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
39. Courts often rely on canons of construction when interpreting the language of a
statute. The canons cannot be relied upon, however, as strict rules of law. They are
merely aids to construction that offer guidance in ascertaining whether Congress in-
tended employers and pension funds to have standing to sue under ERISA.
40. See F. McCAFFREY, supra note 36, at § 17; SUTHERLAND, supra note 35, at § 47.23.
41. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979). See also supra note 40.
42. 674 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1982).
43. Id. at 1305 (emphasis added). See also Michigan United Food & Commercial
Workers' Unions v. Baerwaldt, 572 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Mich. 1983). In Baerwaldt, the
court held that the fund had standing to sue. In response to defendant's assertion that
plaintiff was not one of the enumerated parties in § 502(a), the court stated that it did
"not read the quoted provision in such a limiting manner" and did "not believe the
provision's language should be read to exclude" a pension plan from suing under ERISA.
Id. at 947. But see Pressroom Union-Printers League Income Sec. Fund v. Continental
FALL 19851
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The force of the expressio unius maxim can be overcome by
evidence of contrary congressional intent or by a showing that
an expanded interpretation of the statute would serve the pur-
pose for which the statute was enacted." This Note establishes
both types of evidence with respect to the omission of employers
and pension funds from section 502(a), thus negating the ex-
pressio unius presumption. 45 Furthermore, in light of the reali-
ties of the legislative drafting process, a failure to enumerate
employers and pension plans in section 502(a), without more,
does not demonstrate a congressional intention to leave these
parties without redress under ERISA.46 Despite its superficial
appeal, therefore, courts and commentators recognize this
maxim as "unreliable" and caution that expressio unius must be
applied judiciously. 47 In sum, the omission of employers and
Assurance Co., 700 F.2d 889 (2d Cir.) (holding that the absence of employee benefit
plans from § 502(a) must be construed as an intentional omission by Congress), cert.
dismissed, 463 U.S. 1233, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983); Amalgamated Indus. Union
Local 44-A Health and Welfare Fund v. Webb, 562 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (follow-
ing Pressroom).
44. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 727 F.2d 481
(5th Cir. 1984); Hillis v. Waukesha Title Co., 576 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Basile
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 580 (S.D. Ohio 1982); SUTH-
ERLAND, supra note 35, at § 47.23. See also Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry. Co., 475 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Potomac Passengers Ass'n, the D.C.
Circuit held that parties not enumerated under § 307 of the Rail Passenger Service Act
of 1970 (the "Amtrak Act"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-658 (1970) (i.e., parties other than the
Attorney General and employees), had standing to sue under the Act. The court held
that in this instance, expressio unius gave way to a congressional purpose to benefit
passengers. Id. at 331. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed this decision, but on fac-
tual grounds. 414 U.S. 453 (1974). The Court affirmed the lower court's reasoning as to
the possibility of overcoming the expressio rule of exclusion by a showing of contrary
legislative purpose or intent. Id. at 458-61. The Court found, however, that the D.C.
Circuit had erred in its interpretation of the legislative history underlying the "Amtrak
Act." The Court held that Congress's deliberate failure to adopt a proposal that would
have amended § 307 to include "any aggrieved parties," evidenced Congress's intent to
preclude passengers from suing to enforce compliance under the Act. Id. at 459-60.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 63-67.
46. Not all omissions are deliberately drafted. Other reasons for omissions can in-
clude congressional oversight, lack of information, or a failure on the part of Congress to
foresee a particular situation. It is therefore inappropriate to "impute omniscience to
Congress." See Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Court-
room, 50 U. CHi. L. REv. 800, 813 (1983).
47. Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 n.23 (1983) (rejecting use of
expressio unius, noting that the canon has been "subordinated to the doctrine that
courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general pur-
pose") (quoting S.E.C. v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943)); Illinois
Dep't of Public Aid v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir. 1983) ("not every silence is
pregnant"; therefore expressio unius is an "uncertain guide to interpreting statutes");
United States Dep't of Labor v. Bethlehem Mines, 669 F.2d 187, 197 (4th Cir. 1982)
(recognizing the maxim as unreliable); National Petroleum Refiners Assoc. v. F.T.C., 482
F.2d 672, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the maxim "stands on the faulty premise
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pension plans from section 502(a) is not dispositive in determin-
ing Congress's intent with respect to these parties' standing to
sue under ERISA.
B. Consistency Within the Statute
A second fundamental principle of statutory construction is
that a statute is passed as a whole and is animated by one gen-
eral purpose. This principle is the so-called whole statute
canon.4 8 Thus, courts should not construe statutory phrases in
isolation. When a court is interpreting a single provision of a
statute, every effort should be made to find such a meaning as
will render the statute a harmonious whole. In construing stand-
ing to sue under ERISA, a court should read section 502(a) to-
gether with the other subparts of section 502.
Subsection 502(d) of ERISA provides, in pertinent part, that
"an employee benefit plan may sue or be sued under this title as
an entity. '49 A harmonization of sections 502(a) and 502(d) can
be achieved only by construing both sections as granting pension
plans standing to sue under ERISA, or alternatively, by inter-
preting both sections as denying pension plans standing to sue.
Construing section 502(d) as denying pension plans standing to
sue under ERISA would be inconsistent with the language of
section 502(d). Such a construction would violate the plain
meaning rule of. construction, which provides that a statute
that all possible alternatives. . were necessarily considered and rejected by the legisla-
tive draftsmen"), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); Massachusetts Trustees of Eastern
Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 312 F.2d 214, 220 (1st Cir. 1963) ("Whether the
specification of one matter means the exclusion of another is a matter of legislative in-
tent for which one must look to the statute as a whole."), aff'd, 377 U.S. 235 (1964);
Hillis v. Waukesha Title Co., 576 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (holding that this
maxim is to be cautiously applied); F. McCAFFREY, supra note 36, at § 17; SUTHERLAND,
supra note 35, at § 47.25; Posner, supra note 46, at 813.
48. United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822 (1984); Green v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 707 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983); F. MCCAFFREY, supra note 36, at § 8; SUTHERLAND,
supra note 35, at § 46.05.
49. ERISA § 502(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d) (1982) in its entirety provides:
(d)(1) An employee benefit plan may sue or be sued under this title as an
entity. Service of summons, subpoena, or other legal process of a court upon a
trustee or an administrator of an employee benefit plan in his capacity as such
shall constitute service upon the employee benefit plan. In a case where a plan
has not designated in the summary plan description of the plan an individual as
agent for the service of legal process, service upon the Secretary shall constitute
such service. The Secretary, not later than 15 days after receipt of service under
the preceding sentence, shall notify the administrator or any trustee of the plan
of receipt of such service.
There is no analogous provision regarding employers.
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should be given a literal interpretation. 0
Absent persuasive evidence to the contrary, a statute "must
be interpreted to mean exactly what it says."'5' Section 502(d)
states that an employee benefit plan "may sue . . . under this
Title." The phrase "under this Title" refers to Title I of ERISA,
constituting the provisions concerning protection of employee
benefit rights and enforcement of ERISA's provisions. There is
nothing in the legislative history to suggest that Congress in-
tended section 502(d) to be construed contrary to its plain
meaning. Hence, according to the plain meaning of section
502(d), pension plans should have standing to sue to enforce
ERISA's provisions.
In Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Security Fund
v. Continental Assurance Co.,52 however, the Second Circuit ig-
nored the plain meaning of section 502(d) and restrictively con-
strued its language s.5  The court held that section 502(d) deals
only with legal capacity, not standing to sue.54 In other words, in
the opinion of the Second Circuit, section 502(d) does not imply
that pension plans "may bring actions under ERISA; it merely
authorizes suits to be brought by funds in other situations where
there would properly be jurisdiction." '
The Second Circuit's overly technical construction of the sec-
tion would permit a fund to sue in its own name in minor mat-
ters, such as state law contract claims, but not in major matters,
such as the enforcement of ERISA. The court cites no authority
to support such a distinction. Moreover, the court's strained in-
terpretation of section 502(d) would violate the principle that
effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause, and sen-
tence of a statute.86 The clause "under this title," contained in
section 502(d), would be rendered meaningless by a decision that
50. In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1984); Shaffer v. Block, 705 F.2d 805 (6th Cir.
1983); SUTHERLAND, supra note 35, at § 46.01 (closely related to the expressio unius
maxim).
51. F. MCCAFFREY, supra note 36, at § 3.
52. 700 F.2d 899 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1233 (1983).
53. Id. at 893.
54. Id. The court further opined that § 502(d) authorizes suits to be brought against
a pension plan under ERISA. Thus, pension plans would not be able to sue under
ERISA, but would be able to be sued under ERISA. Such a distinction is absurd.
55. Id.
56. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (stating that the Court has an
obligation to "give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used"); Zimmerman v.
North American Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 353 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that courts should
not construe statutes in a way that "makes words or phrases meaningless, redundant or




section 502(d) me'rely confers legal capacity on plans to sue in
actions unrelated to ERISA. To add any meaning to the words
"an employee benefit plan may sue or be sued," the clause
"under this title" must indicate that a fund is authorized to sue
specifically to enforce ERISA provisions.
In sum, to avoid violating the plain meaning canon, section
502(d) must be interpreted as granting pension plans standing
to sue under ERISA. Hence, to reconcile sections 502(d) and
502(a), thereby giving effect to the "whole statute," section
502(a) must also be interpreted as granting pension plans stand-
ing to sue under the Act.
C. Consistency With Amendments
Finally, it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a
statute should be construed in light of, and in conjunction with,
subsequent amendments. 57 ERISA was amended by the Mul-
tiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA).5 s
MPPAA was designed to remedy certain defects in the existing
law relating to funding requirements, plan preservation meas-
ures, and termination insurance programs for multiemployer
pension plans.5 9 An examination of MPPAA indicates that some
of its provisions would be rendered meaningless if section 502(a)
were interpreted as precluding employers from suing to enforce
ERISA's provisions.
Section 410(a) of MPPAA grants employers the right to re-
cover mistaken contributions to plans within a specified period
of time. 60 It stands to reason that, in drafting this provision,
57. Republic Steel Corp. v. Castle, 581 F.2d 1228, 1232 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 909 (1978) (holding that court is bound to read statutory amendment together
with original provisions as part of an integrated, harmonious whole); F. McCAFFREY,
supra note 36, at § 81.
58. Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (1980) (amending scattered sections of 26 & 29
U.S.C.).
59. H.R. REP. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2918. The MPPAA amendments were drafted for the purpose of "improving re-
tirement income security ... by strengthening the funding requirements ... authoriz-'
ing plan preservation measures for financially troubled multi-employer pension plans,"
and particularly by "revising the rules governing the termination insurance program."
Id.
60. Section 410(a) (ERISA § 403(c)(2)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1982)), in
pertinent part, states:
In the case of a contribution ... made by an employer to a multiemployer plan
by a mistake of fact or law . . . paragraph (1) shall not prohibit the return of
such contributions. . . to the employer within 6 months after the plan adminisa
trator determines that the contribution was made by such a mistake.
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Congress intended employers to have some means to enforce this
right. Yet, Congress left the basic standing provisions of ERISA
untouched rather than enacting new, independent standing pro-
visions for MPPAA.6 1 An overly narrow interpretation of section
502(a), denying standing to employers to sue under ERISA,
would effectively render this provision of MPPAA a nullity. Em-
ployers would have the right to recover mistaken contributions
under MPPAA, but would have no means to enforce this right.
Thus, because MPPAA has no standing provisions of its own, it
can be inferred that Congress assumed that section 502(a) ex-
tended standing to employers to bring suit under ERISA, mak-
ing it unnecessary for Congress to enact a separate standing pro-
vision for MPPAA.
The foregoing analysis of the language and structure of section
502 suggests that Congress did not intend to leave employers
and pension funds without redress under ERISA. First, the
omission of employers and pension funds from section 502(a) is
not necessarily significant. For example, notwithstanding this
omission, the Ninth Circuit in Fentron Industries, Inc. v. Na-
tional Shopmen Pension Fund6 2 found employers to have stand-
ing to sue under the Act. Second, section 502(a) must be inter-
preted consistently with section 502(d) as granting pension plans
standing to sue under ERISA, so as to render the statute a har-
monious whole. Finally, section 502(a) must be construed as
granting employers standing to sue under ERISA so that certain
provisions of MPPAA are not rendered meaningless. Interpret-
ing section 502(a) as denying employers standing to sue would
leave employers with no means to enforce certain rights granted
to them under MPPAA.
This examination of ERISA's language should not be the end
ERISA § 403(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1982) ("paragraph 1") provides that, except
as provided in ERISA § 403(c)(2), (3), or (4) (29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2), (3), or (4) (1982)),
plan assets shall never inure to the employer's benefit. MPPAA § 410(a), ERISA
§ 403(c)(2)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1982) is a very limited exception to this
general rule.
61. ERISA § 4301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982), entitled "Persons entitled to main-
tain actions," provides that an "employer ...who is adversely affected by the act or
omission of any party under this subtitle with respect to a multiemployer plan ... may
bring an action for appropriate legal or equitable relief, or both."
This section, however, does not provide standing or subject-matter jurisdiction over
refund actions. Section 4301(a)(1) of ERISA is expressly limited to actions brought
under the subtitle of MPPAA relating to employer withdrawal liability. See Crown Cork
& Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund, 549 F. Supp. 307, 310 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1982), afl'd
mem., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983); EM Trucks, Inc. v. Central States, Southeast and
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 517 F. Supp. 1122, 1124 (D. Minn. 1981).
62. 674 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1982). See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
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of a thorough inquiry into legislative intent. Where the statutory
language does not conclusively convey Congress's intent, the leg-
islative history of the statute should be consulted.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY UNDERLYING SECTION 502
In an introductory section to ERISA, Congress reported its
findings that employee benefit plans have "become an important
factor affecting the stability of employment and the successful
development of industrial relations." s In view of such findings,
Congress passed ERISA, in part, to "strike an appropriate bal-
ance between the interests of employers . ..and the need of
the workers for a level of protection which will adequately pro-
tect their rights. '64 Hence, an expansive interpretation of section
502(a), allowing employers to sue to enforce ERISA provisions
where the employer has been injured, would promote the pur-
pose that ERISA was intended to serve. In Fentron, the Ninth
Circuit's decision to grant employers standing to sue under
ERISA was based, in part, on its interpretation of the purposes
underlying the Act. Specifically, the court emphasized "the in-
tent of Congress to protect employer-employee relations."66
The legislative history underlying ERISA also indicates that
Congress intended ERISA to be a "remedial statute which
should be liberally construed."66 Moreover, Congress intended
the provisions of section 502 to provide "broad remedies for re-
dressing or preventing violations of the Act. '6 7 A liberal con-
struction expands the meaning of a law to embrace cases that
are within the spirit or reason of the law. Expanding the mean-
ing of section 502(a) so as to provide remedies for injured em-
ployers and/or pension funds is within the spirit of ERISA as
intended by Congress.
63. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982).
64. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong, 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 4639, 4647 (emphasis added).
65. 674 F.2d at 1305. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. See also Building
Serv. Employee's Pension Trust v. Horseman's Quarter Horse Racing Ass'n, 98 F.R.D.
458 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (court rejecting defendant's argument that ERISA was designed
solely to protect the interests of employees and not the relationship between employers
and employees).
66. H.R. RE. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1974); see also Kross v. Western Elec-
tric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1983).
67. Laborers Fringe Benefit Funds-Detroit & Vicinity v. Northwest Concrete & Con-
str., Inc., 640 F.2d 1350, 1352 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting H.R. REP No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 17, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4655).
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If section 502(a) is interpreted to encompass employers and
pension plans, an employer could bring suit against a pension
plan for failing to pay employees' vested pension benefits or for
cancelling past service credits.8 8 This type of action would pro-
mote ERISA's primary purposes, which are the protection of
workers against the loss of their pensions and the protection of
employer-employee relations. Moreover, if employers are unable
to seek redress for injuries sustained under ERISA, the law
would create a disincentive to new employers who are consider-
ing entering a plan. This disincentive would clearly be counter-
productive to Congress's goals in passing ERISA. A liberal con-
struction of section 502(a) would further enhance the security of
plan participants because pension funds would be able to sue to
recover money fraudulently extracted from them. 9 Thus, in
keeping with Congress's intent, courts should read section 502(a)
liberally as authorizing employers and pension funds to bring
suit under ERISA.
IV. STATUTES IN Pari Materia
To ascertain legislative intent from statutory language, other
statutes concerning the same subject can also be examined. Stat-
utes dealing with the same subject as tlte statute being con-
strued are commonly referred to as statutes in pari materia.Y°
Statutes deemed to be in pari materia should be construed to-
gether.7 1 Two statutes may be considered to be in pari materia
when they relate to the same class of persons or when they have
the same purpose or object.
2
ERISA and the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA) 73
relate to the same two general classes of persons-employers
68. See discussion of Fentron Indus., Inc. v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 674
F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1982), supra note 10.
69. See discussion of Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Sec. Fund v. Conti-
nental Assurance Co., 700 F.2d 889 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 463 U.S. 1233, cert. denied,
464 U.S. 845 (1983), supra note 11.
It may not make sense to require that the trustee/fiduciary, as opposed to the fund as
an entity, bring suit in this case. Often, the trustees lack the personal financial resources
to support a lawsuit of any magnitude. Thus, the fund ultimately pays all of the fees and
costs of litigation. The fund's office contains all of the records pertaining to the action,
and the fund's staff are knowledgeable concerning the issues at stake.
70. SUTHERLAND, supra note 35, at § 51.01.
71. Id. at § 51.02. See also Jones v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 728 F.2d 257,
262 (6th Cir. 1984).
72. In re Robison, 665 F.2d 166, 171 (7th Cir. 1981).
73. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1982).
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and employees. Moreover, the two statutes have overlapping
purposes. Section one of the LMRA provides, inter alia, that the
purpose of the statute is to "promote free flow of commerce," to
"prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employ-
ers in their relations," and to "provide orderly and peaceful pro-
cedures for preventing the interference by either [employees or
employers] with the legitimate rights of the other. 7 4 Similarly,
ERISA was passed to "provide for the free flow of commerce,"
to "protect the stability of employment," and to "strike a bal-
ance between the interests of employers and the workers."7
Thus, it is fair to characterize ERISA and the LMRA as statutes
in pari materia.
In addition, the direct reference of ERISA's legislative history
to the LMRA suggests that ERISA and the LMRA should be
construed together. In a Conference Report on H.R. 2, ERISA,
Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare, stAted that "[iut is in-
tended that [actions to enforce ERISA] will be regarded as aris-
ing under the laws of the United States, in similar fashion to




It is well established that an employer has standing to sue
under section 301 of the LMRAs.7  Thus, construing section 502
of ERISA in light of section 301 of the LMRA would support
this Note's position that employers should be granted standing
to sue under ERISA. Moreover, section 301(b) of the LMRA
provides that labor organizations "may sue or be sued as an en-
tity. '7' The Supreme Court has construed this language to grant
labor organizations standing to sue under the LMRA. s0 Section
74. Id. at § 141.
75. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
76. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). Section
301 provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
77. 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974).
78. See Norton v. I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund, 553 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Nor-
ton, an employee and employer brought an action pursuant to LMRA § 301 against a
union pension fund, seeking a declaratory judgment establishing the employee's eligibil-
ity for pension benefits.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1982).
80. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ale., 353 U.S. 448 (1957). This
case was an action brought by a labor union seeking specific performance of the arbitra-
tion provisions of a collective bargaining contract. The specific issue on appeal is irrele-
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502(d) of ERISA provides, in language identical to that of sec-
tion 301(b) of the LMRA, that pension funds, as opposed to la-
bor organizations, "may sue or be sued as an entity. 8 1 Hence,
construing section 502(d) of ERISA in light of section 301(b) of
the LMRA would buttress the argument that section 502(d) was
intended to authorize funds to bring suit to enforce ERISA's
provisions.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis of the conflicting legal prece-
dents interpreting section 502, the language of the section, the
legislative history underlying ERISA, and the relation of ERISA
to the LMRA, this Note concludes that Congress did not intend
section 502(a) to be exclusive or to preclude employers or pen-
sion funds from suing to enforce ERISA's provisions. Thus
courts, consistent with Congress's intentions, should grant em-
ployers and pension funds, collectively, statutory standing to sue
under ERISA.
-Constance L. Bauer
vant to the present discussion. Implicit, however, in the Court's reversal of the Fifth
Circuit and affirmance of the district court's decision to order the employer to comply
with the contract, is the Court's acknowledgement of the union's standing to sue under
the LMRA.
81. See supra note 49.
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